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How to Group Market Participants? 
Heterogeneity in Hedging Behavior 
 
Abstract 
Using a generalized mixture model, we model individual heterogeneity by identifying groups 
of participants that respond in a similar manner to the determinants of economic behavior. The 
procedure emphasizes the role of theory as the determinants of behavior are used to 
simultaneously explain market activities and to discriminate among groups of market 
participants. We show the appealing properties of this modeling approach by comparing it with 
two often used grouping methods in an empirical study in which we estimate the factors 
affecting market participants’ hedging behavior. 
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Introduction 
Economists are becoming more aware of the effect of heterogeneity in understanding 
economic phenomena. Recent studies suggest that heterogeneity is an omitted variable that needs 
to be taken into account to develop an appropriate understanding of individual consumption, 
asset allocation, and productivity activities (e.g., Heckman; Caselli and Ventura; Herrendorf, 
Valentinyi and  Waldmann). Various empirical methods have been employed to address 
heterogeneous behavior in economic analysis, including a priori classification of the decision 
units and cluster analysis. In this paper, we propose the use of a generalized mixture model to 
investigate the hedging behavior of market participants. The generalized mixture model classifies 
decision makers into groups based on whether participants respond in a similar manner to the 
determinants of behavior (Wedel and Kamakura; Wedel and DeSarbo). Within a group, the  
influence of these determinants on behavior is the same while the actual behavior is dependent 
on the level of these determinants. In effect, each group has a different econometric structure 
which is estimated with the observations that have the highest probability of conforming to that 
structure. In the context of an economic situation, the mixture method is attractive because it 
groups decision makers into groups so that within each group the responses of its members to the 
economic determinants of behavior are similar. Because classification is based on the 
determinants of behavior, the method emphasizes the role of economic theory in grouping 
decision makers rather than a simple reliance on arbitrary decisions or statistical analysis of the 
behavior considered.   
Previous studies have associated heterogeneity with differences in observable variables, often 
using characteristics such as age or firm size to separate decision makers into groups. We 
implicitly propose to segment decision-makers into groups based on their decision-making 
behavior as revealed in the relationship between economic behavior and its determinants. 
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Heterogeneity in this context implies that individual decision making may be driven by factors 
that are not the same for all decision makers or that the effects of the factors across individuals 
may differ.  
We investigate the properties of the grouping procedure for a sample of hog producers, 
wholesalers, and processors in a hedging context. Specifically, we compare and discuss the 
results of the generalized regression mixture model with two other grouping procedures often 
used in (agricultural) economics. The first procedure groups the popula tion based on an arbitrary 
classification, e.g., company type, which translates into grouping the decision-makers based on 
whether they are a producer, wholesaler or processor. The second procedure is cluster analysis  
(CA) which groups participants based on the similarities they have regarding a set of variables 
(e.g., characteristics). While these grouping procedures are intuitive appealing, their 
attractiveness declines when we realize that they do not capture the idea that heterogeneity of 
economic behavior can be driven by differences in the decision-making process. 
 The remainder of the paper is organized in a straightforward manner. First we provide a 
brief overview of grouping methods. Then we present the generalized mixture modeling 
procedure, showing how it emphasizes economic theory and discussing its advantages and 
limitations compared to the other grouping procedures. The merits of the mixture model are then 
illustrated in our empirical study, comparing its results with the two other procedures used. 
Finally we discuss the results and offer suggestions for future research. 
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Grouping Methods 
Classification of statistical grouping methods 
Grouping methods are classified based on whether the groups are determined in advance by the 
researcher, a-priori methods, or are determined on the basis of data analysis, post-hoc methods. 
Grouping methods can also be classified based on whether they are descriptive or predictive. 
Descriptive methods examine heterogeneity without making a distinction between dependent or 
independent variables while predictive methods do make the distinction.  
 Based on this general taxonomy, we select two widely used grouping methods and compare 
their empirical findings with those from the proposed generalized mixture regression grouping 
method. The first method is an a-priori procedure that segments the population based on 
company type. The second method is a form of cluster analysis that can be classified as a post-
hoc descriptive method. The generalized mixture regression grouping method can be classified 
as a post-hoc predictive method.   
 
Single-variable grouping: Company-type grouping 
To understand the factors that drive agents’ behavior (e.g., contract behavior), agricultural 
economists often group these participants based on a priori hypotheses about how decision 
makers behave. For example, when trying to understand the factors that drive contract behavior 
of producers, wholesalers and processors, one might group the sample based on whether the 
agricultural market participant is a processor, wholesaler or producer. The next step would be to 
run a regression analysis for each group separately where behavior is explained by a set of 
explanatory variables. We refer to this method as the company-type grouping (CTG). CTG 
simply means that we split our sample along the lines of company type (e.g. producer, 
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wholesaler and processor) and estimate within each group the relationship between hedging 
behavior and a set of explanatory variables identified in the literature. This two-step procedure 
assumes that all participants within a group behave in a similar manner, and that this differs from 
how participants in other groups behave.  
 
Cluster analysis grouping 
 Another procedure often used is cluster analysis (CA). CA is a grouping method in which 
there is no formal distinction between dependent and independent variables. CA’s identifies 
market participants based on the “average values” of the characteristics they possess, and 
classifies them so that each market participant is similar to other agents in its cluster. In our 
analysis these characteristics refer to the extent of hedging, and the set of explanatory variables 
associated with hedging. In the empirical study we use a hierarchical agglomerative average 
linkage cluster procedure in which the Euclidean distance is used as a measure of similarity (e.g., 
Hair et al.). Hierarchical refers to the fact that classification has an increasing number of nested 
classes, resembling a phylogenetic classification. This bottom-up strategy starts by placing each 
market participant in its own cluster and then merges these clusters based on the Euclidean 
distance between the clusters. The number of groups is determined by the dendogram and 
magnitude of change in the fusion coefficient, the latter being the level of similarity at fusion 
versus the number of clusters (Everitt). Subsequently we estimate within each identified cluster 
(e.g., group) the relationship between hedging behavior and a set of explanatory variables (The 
hierarchical agglomerative average linkage cluster procedure is described in detail in the 
Appendix). While this grouping method is useful in identifying groups, the results are often 
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hampered by the limited theoretical rationale for the classifications. Hence, grouping is often a 
statistical exercise and the interpretation can sometimes be very difficult. 
 
Decision-making process as a grouping criteria 
When economists model behavior they identify the theoretical factors that influence decision 
makers’ activities. Empirical estimates of the coefficients of the underlying model reveal the 
importance of these factors in the decision-making process. Differences in the coefficients across 
participants may arise as decision makers place different weights on the factors influencing their 
behavior, resulting in an econometric structure that is not homogeneous. If differences occur in a 
systematic way across participants, it would be attractive to classify observations such that 
participants within a group respond in a similar way to the determinants of behavior. This logic 
leads to the use of the generalized mixture framework for grouping participants such that the 
decision-making process as revealed in the estimated coefficients is similar within but different 
across groups. For economists, this idea is a natural and useful way of thinking about 
heterogeneity and the classification of participants. The mixture method segments market 
participants based on their underlying decision-making process as reflected in a relation between 
economic behavior and the determinants of that behavior. For developing a better understanding 
of behavior and policy purposes, it is of value to classify participants so that they reflect similar 
decision-making characteristics.  
To this point, we have referred to groups as if they were directly observable. However, this 
may not be the case, particularly if what influences participants’ response are differences in the 
underlying decision-making process. In this case, differences in the way that participants respond 
to the determinants of their behavior - the heterogeneity in the decision-making process - are 
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unobserved prior to estimation, but drive heterogeneity of observed economic behavior. 
Differences in the decision-making process are only revealed through the estimated coefficients 
of the relationship between the behavior which are developed in the statistical procedure. 
 
Generalized Mixture Regression Grouping 
To address unobservable (e.g., latent) groups based on the decision-making process we need a 
modeling procedure that groups participants together so that the members of each group have a 
similar relationship between behavior and the set of independent variables driving it as reflected 
by the estimated regression coefficients which will differ across groups. In an econometric sense, 
each group will have a different structure (i.e., different coefficients that reflect the relationship 
between the dependent and the independent variables) that is estimated with the observations that 
have the highest probability of conforming to that structure. From a conceptual perspective, such 
a procedure permits the determinants of behavior to have a different influence on actual hedging 
practices for each group identified. The generalized mixture regression framework based on 
work by Wedel and Desarbo and others allows us to simultaneously investigate the relationship 
between economic behavior and a set of explanatory variables for each unobserved group in the 
population and at the same time identify these groups. 
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Model specification 
Mixture models assume that a sample of observations arises from a number of underlying 
populations of unknown proportions. A specific form of the density function is specified, and the 
mixture approach decomposes the sample into its components. Conditional mixture models have 
been developed that allow for the simultaneous probabilistic classification of observations and 
the estimation of regression models relating covariates to the expectations of the dependent 
variable within unobserved (latent) groups (DeSarbo and Cron). We use a generalized linear 
regression mixture model first formulated by Wedel and DeSarbo. This approach allows us to 
simultaneously estimate the probabilistic classification of agricultural market participants by 
their behavior, and to explain behavior by a set of explanatory variables in each group. In our 
empirical analysis, behavior refers the extent to which market participants hedge. 
Assume that the measures on derivative usage are indexed by K,....k 1=  for J,....j 1= market 
participants. The measurements are denoted by jky . We assume that the market participants 
come from a population that is composed of a mixture of G unobserved groups, with relative 
sizes 1p ,… Gp  and that 0>Gp  and .1
1
=å
=
G
g
p  The distribution of jky , given that the market 
participant j comes from group g, is from the exponential family of distributions and is denoted 
as )(\ jkgjk yf .
1 Given group g the expectation of the jky is denoted as gjkJ . Within groups, these 
expectations are modeled as a function of our set of P (p = 1,…P) explanatory variables and the 
parameter vector pgb  in group g: 
å
=
=
P
p pgjkp
xgjkL 1
)( bJ                                                        (1) 
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where L(.) is the link function which links the expectations of the measurements to the 
explanatory variables. Within each identified group the pgb  are the same; however across groups 
they differ. The linear predictor is thus the linear combination of the explanatory variables, and 
the set of betas that are to be estimated. The linear predictor is in turn related to the mean of the 
distribution, gkm , through a link function L(.) such that in group g: 
)()( gjkLgjkL mJ =  .                (2) 
 Thus, for each group, a linear model is formulated with a specification of the distribution of 
the variable (within the exponential family), a linear predictor gjkJ  and a function L(.) that links 
the linear predictor to the expectation of the distribution. Since we assume that the dependent 
variable, the underlying value of the hedge position, is normally distributed, the canonical link is 
the identity, gjkgjk mJ = . By combining Equations (2) and (3), the standard linear regression 
model within groups arises. Because we use a single measure in our empirical study to measure 
hedging behavior, K = 1. 
Then, the unconditional probability density function of an observation jky is: 
å
=
=F
G
g gjk
ygjfgjkyjf 1
)|(|)|( bp ,                                         (3) 
and the likelihood for F  is: 
       )|y(f)y;(L j
J
j
j FF Õ
=
=
1
                (4) 
where jy is the observation vector y of market participant j and gp is the relative group size. 
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An estimate of F , the set of parameters that identifies the groups to which the market 
participants belong, and the regression functions within groups, is obtained by maximizing the 
likelihood of (4) with respect to F  subject to 0>gp  and .1
1
=å
=
G
g
gp  
The parameters of the mixture model can be estimated using the method of moments or 
maximum likelihood (Basford and McLachlan; Hasselblad; Quandt and Ramsey). Since 
maximum likelihood has been shown to be superior for the estimation of the mixture, we use this 
method to estimate the parameters of the model in (4) (cf., Fryer and Robertson; Wedel and 
DeSarbo). The likelihood function is maximized using the iterative EM algorithm (Redner and 
Walker; Titterington).  
The EM algorithm is based on the notion that the likelihood function contains missing 
observations, i.e., the 0/1 membership of subjects in the g groups. If these were known, 
maximization of the likelihood would be straightforward. Based on a multinomial distribution 
for group membership, the expectation of the likelihood can be formulated. This involves 
calculating the posterior membership probabilities according to Bayes rule and the current 
parameter estimates of F  and substituting them into the likelihood. Once this is accomplished, 
the likelihood can be maximized. See Wedel and Kamakura and Pennings and Garcia (2003) for 
the derivation of the EM algorithm. 
The actual number of groups is unknown and must be inferred from the model. We use 
Bozdogan’s Consistent Akaike’s Information Criteria (CAIC) to determine the number of 
groups. The CAIC is defined as: 
)1))(ln(1(ln2 +-+×+-= JGGPLCAIC .                  (5) 
The number of groups that best represents the data is determined when the CAIC reaches a 
minimum. 
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For any set of groups, an Entropy statistic, Eg, can be calculated to assess whether the groups 
are well separated or defined. Eg is defined as: 
åå
==
--=
G
g
jgjg
J
j
g JE
11
/ln1 aa                   (6) 
where gja  is the posterior probability that market participant  j comes from latent group g. The 
posterior probability can be calculated for each observation vector jy  with an estimate of F  
(e.g. Equation (4)) by means of Bayes’ Theorem and is given by: 
å Õ
Õ
= =
==F
G
g
K
k
gjkgjkg
K
k
gjkgjkg
jgj
yf
yf
y
1 1
|
1
|
)|(
)|(
),(
bp
bp
a  .               (7) 
The entropy statistic Eg in (6) is a relative measure, bounded between 0 and 1, and describes the 
degree of separation in the estimated posterior probabilities. Eg values close to 1 indicate that the 
posterior probabilities of the respondents belonging to specific groups are close to either 0 or 1; 
the groups are well defined. Eg values close to 0 indicate that the groups are not well defined. 
The proposed grouping procedure emphasizes the role of theory in the empirical analysis as 
the determinants of behavior are used both to explain behavior and to discriminate among groups 
of individual decision makers. This differs fundamentally from previous studies dealing with 
heterogeneity, where groups were determined a priori, based on a single observable variable or 
by clustering groups based on observable variables. The proposed grouping procedure permits 
the determinants of behavior to have a different influence on actual behavior for each group 
identified. A challenging dimension of using this procedure is to assess why decision makers in a 
particular group might respond differently from participants in other groups.  
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Research Design 
Sample 
To examine heterogeneity in behavior and to illustrate the properties of the generalized 
mixture regression model we use a dataset that reflects hedging activity of producers, 
wholesalers and processors developed by Pennings and Garcia (2003). The sample consists of 
335 producers, 50 wholesalers and 30 processors. A personal computer-guided interview was 
conducted in the first half of 1998 that took place at the market participant’s company. The 
market participants worked through several assignments and questions, and the interviews lasted 
about 35 minutes. We also obtained accounting data from these 415 firms for the fiscal year 
1997 which included information on: company size, leverage, ownership structure, risk 
exposure, number of contracts, corresponding notional value, and education level of decision 
maker. 
 
Determinants of hedging behaviour 
To explain the extent to which market participants hedge we selected variables that have been 
identified in the agricultural economics and finance literature. We hypothesize that factors that 
have been associated with affecting hedging also influence the extent to which market 
participants hedge. Here, we do not review the factors that have been identified to influence 
hedging behavior. The combined work of Froot, Scharfstein and Stein, Nance, Smith and 
Smithson, Mian, Tufano (1996), Géczy, Minton and Schrand, Lee and Hoyt, Koski and Pontiff, 
Pennings and Garcia (2003), and Graham and Rogers provide a discussion of these factors in the 
financial literature. In the agricultural economics literature Asplund, Foster, and Stout, Goodwin 
and Schroeder, Makus et al., Musser, Patrick, and Eckman, Pennings and Leuthold, Shapiro and 
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Brorsen, and Turvey and Baker, provide a discussion of the factors. Based on this literature the 
following variables, with their hypothesized sign in brackets, are: decision-maker’s risk attitude - 
e.g., risk aversion (+), decision-maker’s risk perception (+), the interaction between risk attitude 
and risk perception (+), education level of decision maker (+), the extent to which the decision-
maker’s decision-making unit (DMU) favors hedging (+), firm’s risk exposure (+), firm’s debt-
to-asset ratio (+), and firm size (+).  
 
Measurement of dependent and independent variables 
The dependent variable  describing the economic behavior is the extent of hedging. The extent of 
hedging is measured as the sum of the underlying value of hedged positions in relation to annual 
sales (e.g., Chorafas and Steinmann; Gunther and Siems) which relates closely to the hedge ratio. 
Risk attitude was measured in a set of unique experiments in which we elicited the respondents 
utility function. Our experimental design and procedures follow Pennings and Smidts, and 
Pennings and Garcia (2001). We measure the utility functions of managers in a way consistent 
with the decision-makers’ daily decision-making behavior (e.g., trading in the hog and pork 
markets). The utility function u(x) is assessed by means of the certainty equivalence method (cf. 
Keeney and Raiffa; Smidts). In the certainty equivalence method, the respondent compares a 
certain outcome with the lottery (xl,p;xh), whereby (xl,p;xh) is the two-outcome lottery that 
assigns probability p to outcome xl and probability 1-p to outcome xh, with xl<xh. The certain 
outcome is varied until the respondent reveals indifference, which is denoted by CE(p). By 
applying the Von Neumann-Morgenstern utility u we obtain: u(CE(p)) = pu(xl) + (1-p)u(xh). 
Based on the assessed utility curve, the Pratt-Arrow coefficient of absolute risk aversion was 
derived as a measure of risk attitude (cf. Smidts). An exponential function was fit to each 
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manager’s outcomes; after scaling the boundaries of the functions, the estimation of just one 
parameter suffices to characterize a decision-maker's risk attitude. Since it is the certainty 
equivalents and not the utility levels that are measured with error, the inverse function is 
estimated (see Pennings and Garcia ,2001). Following Pennings and Smidts, risk perception is 
measured by a scale consisting of a number of statements (multi- indicator measurement). The 
scale measures the extent to which decision makers perceive the market in which they operate as 
risky. Confirmatory factor analysis was used to assess the (psychometric) measurement quality 
of our constructs (Hair et al.). The overall fit of the confirmatory factor model provides sufficient 
information to determine whether the set of indicators (items) describes the construct. The 
composite reliability is 0.72, indicating a reliable construct measurement (Hair et al.). The level 
of education is measured on a 5-point scale using the five education levels in the Dutch school 
system. This 5-level system ranges from a high school to a University level. The influence of the 
DMU is measured by asking managers to indicate the extent to which significant persons 
surrounding them thought that they should hedge. The manager was asked to distribute 100 
points between using or not using derivatives as a hedging mechanism to reflect the influence of 
the DMU. Risk exposure is measured by the firms’ annual number of market transactions in the 
cash market to sell (buy) its output (input) (Tufano, 1998). Risk exposure decreases (increases) 
as the number of market transactions increases (decreases). The leverage is measured by the 
firm’s debt-to-asset ratio and the size of the firm is measured by the firm’s annual sales. 
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Empirical Results 
Assuming homogeneity 
Table 1 shows the OLS results when we assume a homogeneous decision-making process and 
hence homogeneity in market participants hedging behavior. The regression has a modest fit with 
a R2 of 0.172. Risk perception and the influence of the DMU are significantly related to the 
extent of hedging which is consistent with Géczy, Minton and Schrand and Pennings and 
Leuthold. 
 
Table 1. Factors Influencing Hedging Behavior: Homogeneous Behavior.  
 
 Regression Coefficients (ß) 
Risk Exposurea  0.160 
Leverage  0.029 
Size of firm -0.08 
Risk Attitude (RA)  0.158 
Risk Perception (RP)  0.122** 
Interaction (RP*RA)b -0.121 
Level of Education  0.440 
DMU  0.382** 
  
Fit Statistics R2 = 0.172 
 F=10.557; df 8 (p=0.000) 
aRisk exposure decreases as the number of market transactions increases, hence we hypothesize a 
negative sign. 
bThe risk perception and risk attitude variables were centered prior to forming the multiplicative term 
(Cronbach; Jaccard, Turrisi and Wan). 
* denotes p< 0.05; ** denotes p< 0.01. 
 
 
The fundamental drivers of risk management, risk attitude and the interaction between risk 
attitude and risk perception are not significantly related to the extent of hedging, a finding that 
has been found in some empirical studies in both agricultural economics and finance (Géczy, 
Minton, and Schrand; Haushalter; Makus et al.; Shapiro and Brorsen). The firm’s leverage is not 
significantly related to the extent of hedging, a finding consistent with Mian, nor is the level of 
education and firm size significantly related to derivative usage.  
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Company-type grouping 
Recall that using the CTG method we group the sample based on whether the market participant 
is a processor, wholesaler or producer. For each group we estimate the relationship between the 
extent of hedging and the independent variables. Seemingly unrelated regression (SUR) is used 
to account for contemporaneous correlation in the errors across equations (Zellner; Srivastava 
and Giles). Table 2 shows the results when we take the heterogeneity in hedging behavior into 
account using the CTG-grouping method. 
 
Table 2. Factors Influencing Hedging Behavior: Grouping Based on Company Type.  
 
 Processors Wholesalers Producers 
 Regression coefficients (ß) 
    
Risk Exposurea -0.215 -0.059 -0.007 
Size of firm  0.234  0.000 -0.037 
Leverage  0.200  0.071  0.056 
Risk Attitude (RA) -0.396  0.113  0.085 
Risk Perception (RP)  0.131 -0.153  0.093* 
Interaction (RP*RA)b -0.031 -0.148  0.089 
Level of Education  0.203  0.017  0.000 
DMU  0.088  0.172  0.219** 
    
Relative Group Size  7.2% (n = 30) 12.0% (n = 50) 80.7% (n = 335) 
Fit Statistic R2=0.335 R2=0.09 R2= 0.094 
 F=1.934; df 8 (p=0.108) F=0.591; df 8 (p=0.779) F=4.467 df 8 (p=0.000) 
 ?2= 15.468; df 8 (p= 
0.051) 
?2= 4.731; df 8 (p= 
0.789) 
?2= 35.734; df 8 (p= 
0.000) 
aRisk exposure decreases as the number of market transactions increases, hence we hypothesize a 
negative sign. 
bThe risk perception and risk attitude variables were centered prior to forming the multiplicative term 
(Cronbach; Jaccard, Turrisi and Wan). 
* denotes p< 0.05; ** denotes p< 0.01. 
 
For processors and wholesalers, none of the explanatory variables are significantly related to 
hedging behavior. For producers, risk perception and the influence of decision making unit are 
significantly related to hedging behavior, a similar result to the homogeneous case. The strong 
influence of the decision making unit on producers hedging behavior confirms the empirical 
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results found in organizational behavior literature and decision sciences where it has been shown 
that the manager’s decision making unit has a significant impact on decisions (e.g., Moriarty and 
Bateson). The fact that the model fits are low and that almost none of the hypothesized 
relationships between hedging behavior and the set of explanatory variables are significant 
indicates that this a priori grouping method is not able to identify heterogeneity in market 
participants’ hedging behavior. In part, this may be explained by the fact that the classification in 
the CTG method is not based on the determinants of hedging behavior but rather on an arbitrary 
grouping criterion.  
 
Cluster analysis grouping  
Based on the hierarchical agglomerative average linkage cluster procedure, the market 
participants were segmented in three groups. Recall that in this procedure clusters (e.g., groups) 
are formed based on the similarities of market participants with respect to variables in our 
analysis (e.g., firm size, risk attitude, risk perception, etc). To gain insight in whether these 
clusters differ significantly regarding the means of the variables we used ANOVA. All three 
clusters were significantly different, and based on the extent of hedging can be described as “low 
users”, “medium users,” and “high users”.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 18 
Table 3. Factors Influencing Hedging Behavior: Grouping Based on Cluster Analysis.  
 
 Group 1 (“low users”) Group 2 (“medium 
users”) 
Group 3 (“high users”) 
 Regression coefficients (ß) 
Risk Exposurea -0.080  0.069 -0.163 
Size of firm -0.052  0.031  0.096 
Leverage -0.083 -0.199**  0.243* 
Risk Attitude (RA)  0.168  0.390* -0.303 
Risk Perception (RP)  0.019  0.102  0.206* 
Interaction (RP*RA)b -0.067 -0.309 -0.059 
Level of Education  0.048 -0.041  0.276** 
DMU  0.167** -0.034  0.226* 
    
Relative Group  57.11% (n = 237) 29.15% (n=121) 13.73% (n = 57) 
Fit Statistic R2= 0.07 R2=0.08 R2=0.327 
 F=2.039; df 8 (p=0.042) F=1.426; df 8 (p=0.193) F=3.400; df 8 (p=0.004) 
 ?2= 16.319; df 8 (p= 
0.004) 
?2= 11.407; df 8 (p= 
0.179) 
?2= 27.203; df 8 (p= 
0.000) 
aRisk exposure decreases as the number of market transactions increases, hence we hypothesize a 
negative sign. 
bThe risk perception and risk attitude variables were centered prior to forming the multiplicative term 
(Cronbach; Jaccard, Turrisi and Wan). 
* denotes p< 0.05; ** denotes p< 0.01. 
 
Table 3 presents the SUR results for the three groups. For group 1 (“low users” that represent 
57.1% of the sample), only the decision making unit significantly impacts hedging behavior. For 
group 2 (“medium users” that represent 29.2% of the sample), hedging behavior is driven by the 
financial structure (e.g., leverage) and risk attitude, however the sign of the leverage variable 
differs from expectations. In contrast, for group 3 (“heavy users” that represent 13.7% of the 
sample), numerous factors appear to affect hedging behavior. The influence of the financial 
structure, risk perception, the level of education, and the decision-making unit which seem to 
drive hedging behavior confirm recent findings in the financial and agricultural economic 
literature (e.g. Goodwin and Schroeder; Makus et al.; Musser, Patrick and Eckman; Nance, 
Smith and Smithson, Géczy, Minton and Schrand). When comparing the results of the CA 
method with those obtained by CTG method, the CA method appears superior; the empirical 
results are more in line with hedging theory, and the statistical findings are more attractive. This 
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finding is not surprising when we realize that the CA method does not arbitrarily group market 
participants, but rather is driven by similarities among the market participants.  
 
Generalized mixture regression grouping 
 
We applied the mixture regression model (Equations 1 to 4) to the data for G = 1 to G = 6. Based 
on the minimum CAIC statistic (Equation 5), we selected G = 3 as the appropriate number of 
groups. The results of the 3 group solution are presented in Table 4. The solution has a log 
likelihood of -934 and an R2 of 0.54. The entropy value of 0.79 indicates that the mixture groups 
are well separated or defined, i.e., the posteriors are close to 1 or 0. The R2 has significantly 
improved from 0.173 for the aggregate regression model (G = 1) to 0.54 for the three-group 
solution (G = 3). 
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Table 4. Factors Influencing Hedging Behavior: Mixture Regression Results  
 
 Regression coefficients(ß) 
 g = 1 g = 2 g = 3 
Risk Exposurea -0.136* -0.103* -0.096 
Size of firm  0.237**  0.207*  0.186 
Influence DMU  0.396**  0.004  0.246* 
Leverage  0.067  0.045  0.291* 
Risk Attitude (RA)  0.009  0.067  0.644* 
Risk Perception (RP)  0.074*  0.031  0.359* 
Interaction (RP*RA)b  0.305*  0.087  0.506* 
Level of Education  0.029  0.128*  0.629** 
    
Relative Group Size p   0.44  0.30  0.26 
 Comparison with Company Type Grouping: 
Percentage of company type in group  
Producers 48.9% (n =164) 28.9% (n = 97) 22.2% (n = 74) 
Wholesalers 36.0% (n = 18) 42.0% (n = 21) 22.0% (n = 11) 
Processors 3.3% (n = 1) 20.0% (n = 6) 76.6% (n =23) 
    
 Comparison with Company Type Grouping: 
Percentage of company type in group  
Group 1 64.1% (n = 152) 19.8% (n = 47) 16.1% (n = 38) 
Group 2 21.5% (n = 26) 51.2% (n = 62) 27.3% (n = 33) 
Group 3 8.8% (n = 5) 26.3% (n =15) 64.9% (n =37) 
    
aRisk exposure decreases as the number of market transactions increases, hence the negative sign. 
bThe risk perception and risk attitude variables were centered prior to forming the multiplicative term 
(Cronbach, 1987; Jaccard, Turrisi and Wan, 1990). 
* denotes p< 0.05; ** denotes p< 0.01. 
 
Group 1 (g = 1) constitutes 44.1% of the sample. For this segment risk exposure, size of firm, 
the influence of the DMU, the manager’s risk perception and the interaction between risk attitude 
and risk perception are significantly related to the extent of hedging which confirms previous 
findings in the agricultural economics and finance literature (e.g., Nance, Smith and Smithson; 
Géczy, Minton and Schrand; Carter and Sinkey). Compared to the other two segments developed 
using the mixture model, this group reflects a low level of derivative use. Group 2 (g = 2) 
constitutes 29.8% of the sample, and shows that risk exposure, size of firm, and level of 
education significantly affect hedging behavior. However, risk attitude, risk perception, and their 
interaction are not significantly related to hedging. For this group the use of derivatives is 
 21 
modest, higher than in Group 1 but lower than in Group 3. For Group 3, which contains 26.1% of 
the sample, numerous factors influence hedging behavior. Risk perception, risk attitude, and their 
interaction, and leverage, the level of education, and the influence of the DMU are all 
significantly related to hedging behavior.  
Table 4 also presents the CTG and the CA groupings in relation to the mixture segments. A 
perfect correspondence between groupings would result in diagonal matrix such that for example 
Group 1 (g=1) from the mixture results would consist of all the producers in the sample. Clearly, 
membership in the groups based on the mixture model does not perfectly coincide with either the 
a-priori or cluster analysis classifications. The highest degree of correspondence is found 
between the CA and the mixture segments, which is consistent with the fact that the 
classifications from both procedures rank the extent of derivative use in a similar manner. It 
should be evident that the mixture procedure places producers, wholesalers and processors in 
groups based on similar hedging behavior rather than on arbitrary classifications. 
Overall, our findings identify the superiority of mixture procedure for identifying the effect of 
heterogeneity on the hedging process. The findings from the mixture model resulted in a large 
number of statistically significant factors influencing hedging in a manner consistent with theory 
and expectations. The improved performance of the mixture model over the other procedures is 
also supported by statistical measures of fit. Furthermore, these results, as shown in Pennings 
and Garcia (2003) have clear economic interpretations. Group 1 is characterized by companies 
whose decision regarding derivative use depends on their risk exposure and the opinions of 
members of the decision-making unit regarding futures usage. This group is dominated by 
relatively small firms that do not use derivatives extensively. Group 2 used derivatives more 
extensively, and has the highest proportion of wholesalers. Use of derivatives seems to be less 
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motivated by risk perceptions and risk attitudes, but more by risk exposure, a behavior consistent 
with ‘natural hedges’ that may be occurring for participants with frequent buying and selling 
opportunities. In contrast, the hedging behavior of the firms in Group 3 is driven by the 
fundamental drivers, risk attitude, risk perception and their interaction, and is consistent  with 
Pratt and Arrow’s models and economic theory that suggest that risk attitude and risk perception 
are important concepts in determining optimal hedging positions (Holthausen; Rolfo). Further, 
other financial determinants such as leverage are significant in these managers’ decisions. 
 
Discussion 
The empirical results show that accounting for heterogeneity increases our understanding 
of economic behavior (e.g., hedging behavior), confirming the recent findings of Heckman that 
heterogeneity is an omitted variable. Furthermore the empirical results reveal that different 
grouping techniques lead to significantly different findings regarding the relationship between 
the hedging behavior and its determinants. When evaluating the three grouping methods in terms 
of the consistency of the empirical results with economic theory we observe a clear hierarchy. 
The grouping technique based on company type (CTG method) performed poorly as hardly any 
variable that has been identified as influencing hedging was significantly related to behavior in 
the groups identified. The cluster analysis (CA) grouping method performed better that the CTG 
method. The improvement in performance can be explained by the fact that prior to the 
regression analysis the CA method grouped participants with respect to the variables in the 
analysis such that members within a group were similar but differed between groups. The 
generalized mixture regression grouping method outperformed both the CA and CTG method as 
the empirical results were most consistent with economic theory, and the statistical findings were 
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stronger. Furthermore, the mixture method has an appealing economic interpretation. That is, the 
generalized method recognizes that heterogeneity in economic behavior can be driven by the 
heterogeneity of the decision-making process. The mixture method classifies market participants 
based on their decision-making process as measured by whether participants respond to the 
determinants of behavior in a similar manner. These results suggest that the mixture method may 
be a response to the recent search for procedures that account for heterogeneity in a theoretical 
consistent way (Heckman; Caselli and Ventura; Herrendorf, Valentinyi and Waldmann). 
 The results of the mixture grouping method show that its groups are not homogeneous with 
respect to the type of market participants, and that its groups differ from those developed through 
more conventional cluster analysis. The performance of the mixture method suggests that 
heterogeneity emerges from differences in the influence of the determinants of derivative use on 
behavior rather than from a single observable variable (e.g., company type), or a statistical 
classification of variables based on differences in their ‘means’. To ignore the heterogeneity 
driven by the decision-making process can lead to a misunderstanding of the factors influencing 
economic behavior, and may result in economic costs from classifying market participants 
incorrectly. 
  What do the results imply for agricultural economists when grouping participants to gain 
insight into economic behavior? Should we always use the mixture method? In our view, 
economic theory should drive the grouping method used, and in this paper we demonstrate that 
the mixture method is a procedure that can be used successfully to group market participants 
based on theory. However, the improved performance of the mixture method comes at a cost. 
The grouping criteria are unobservable and hence the groups are latent. In terms of our empirical 
work, this means that we can not observe the beta coefficients in the regressions for market 
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participants (e.g., reflecting market participants’ decision-making process) that are the basis for 
grouping without performing the analysis. For extension economists and marketers who are 
primarily interested in reaching the groups identified in the mixture method analysis, this may be 
an important limitation. This contrasts with the CA and the CTG methods which provide criteria, 
although not necessarily the most useful for classifying participants into groups with similar 
behavior, that are readily observable, and can result in more straightforward classifications. 
Hence, while the mixture method may be more useful for developing an understanding of 
economic phenomena in the presence of heterogeneity, it may be limited in a practical sense. 
One way to cope with this practical dilemma is to profile the groups and to find observable 
profile variables that can be used as a proxy to group the sample and/or identity to which group a 
market participant belongs. For example, in our data, we performed this procedure on the groups 
from the mixture analysis, and found that the ownership structure differed significantly across 
the three groups. Group 3 (g=3), for which the fundamental risk variables are most important, is 
dominated by limited and public companies, i.e., companies that have third-party (outside) 
shareholders. These companies are inclined to optimize their risk-return trade off in order to 
maximize shareholder value, and hence it seems logical that the fundamental risk variables play 
a role for this group. This contrasts with Groups 1 and 2 from the mixture analysis which are 
dominated by private companies and where derivative use is less extensive. Since one can 
observe the ownership structure, extension economist and marketers could use this variable as a 
tool to reach the different groups. Clearly, future research should try to identify a more formal 
procedure to make the mixture method attractive from a practical as well as conceptual 
perspective. However, in light of the fact that the underlying decision-making process of 
participants is not directly observable, this will be a challenge. In the end, trade offs may exist 
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between consistency with theory, the costs of misclassifying participants, and practically. In the 
near future, these trade offs may be less problematic as we collect more information about 
market participants and their behavior.   
 
FOOTNOTES 
1. The exponential family includes the normal, binomial, poisson, and gamma distributions. 
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Appendix:  Cluster Analysis 
In the appendix we discuss the hierarchical agglomerative average linkage cluster procedure. 
Assume we have k measurements on each of the n market participants. The kn ´  matrix of 
the raw data is then transformed into a nn ´ matrix of distance measures (e.g., similarities), 
where the distances are computed between pairs of market participants across the k variables. 
The goal of cluster analysis now is to arrive at groups of market participants that display small 
within-group variation relative to the between-groups variation.  Consider the market participants 
in a k dimensional space, with each of the k variables represented by one of the axes of the space, 
we can than think of the groups as continuous regions appearing in this space with a relatively 
large mass.  
To measure the distance between market participants we use a Euclidean distance measure. 
Each market participant can be represented by a vector of observations )...,(' 21 pxxxX = on the k 
variables. Denote )...,(' 2,,1 ipiii xxxX =  as the measurements collected on the ith market 
participant. The Euclidean distance measure can now be defined as: 2/12
1
)(å
=
-=
K
k
jkikij xxd  
where ijd denotes the distance between two market participants i and j. 
The hierarchical agglomerative cluster analysis procedure performs successive fusions of the 
data. Each market participant starts out in its own group. At the next level, the two closest market 
participants are fused. At the third level, a new market participant joins the group containing the 
two market participants, or another group is formed. This process continues until eventually a 
single group contains all n market participants. The distance between groups then is defined as 
the average distance between all pairs of points, using åå
i j
ij
JI
d
nn
1
where In  and Jn are the 
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numbers of market participants in the two groups. The optimal number of groups can be 
determined inspecting the dendogram and the fusion coefficient. The dendogram shows which 
groups are joined together and at what distance, and at latter stages which groups are joined 
together into larger groups. Srivastava suggests that the optimal number of groups arises when 
the "foothills" become "mountain peaks" in plots of the dendogram. Another criterion to 
establish the number of groups is the change in the fusion coefficient, where the fusion 
coefficient is defined as the squared Euclidean distance over which two groups are joined. 
Because larger fusion coefficients indicate more distance between groups, a large jump in the 
magnitude of fusion coefficients indicates the optimal number of groups (Hair. et al). 
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